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I. Introduction
Foodborne illness remains an ongoing public health
challenge in both the developing and industrialized worlds.1 In the
United States, almost 50 million reported cases of infectious disease
occur every year from a food product, resulting in substantial
morbidity and mortality with economic burdens to health care and
productivity. 2 Despite recognition as a leader in food safety, the U.S.
experiences longstanding and novel issues in food safety. 3 Advances
in whole genome sequencing (WGS) promise to bolster food safety
regulators’ capabilities to identify pathogens and determine their
source. 4 However, inefficiencies in tracing food products through the
supply chain remain. 5
Simultaneously, practical applications are beginning to
emerge for new distributed ledger technologies, including
blockchain. 6 First popularized by the Bitcoin cryptocurrency,
blockchain has been hailed as a transformative technology for any
industry engaged in recordkeeping. 7 Blockchain has attracted
J.D. Candidate, 2020, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law; Master of Science
and Technology Policy, 2017, Arizona State University. With many thanks to Gary
Marchant and David McCarville for helpful comments and suggestions.
1
Diane G. Newell et al., Food-Borne Diseases — The Challenges of 20 Years Ago
Still Persist While New Ones Continue to Emerge, 139 INT’L J. FOOD MICROBIOLOGY
S3, S4 (2010).
2
Robert L. Scharff, Economic burden from health losses due to foodborne illness in
the United States, 75 J. FOOD PROT. 123, 123 (2012).
3
RENÉE JOHNSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE FDA FOOD SAFETY
MODERNIZATION ACT (P.L. 111-353) 1 (Feb. 18, 2011).
4
Jennifer L. Gardy & Nicholas J. Loman, Towards A Genomics-Informed, RealTime, Global Pathogen Surveillance System, 19 NATURE REV. GENETICS 9 (2018).
5
Thea King et al., Food Safety for Food Security: Relationship Between Global
Megatrends and Developments in Food Safety, 68 TRENDS FOOD SCI. & TECH. 160,
170 (2017).
6
DYLAN YAGA ET AL., U.S. NAT’L INST. STANDARDS & TECH., NISTIR 8202,
BLOCKCHAIN TECHNOLOGY OVERVIEW 1 (2018), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/i
r/2018/NIST.IR.8202.pdf [hereinafter NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ].
7
Marco Iansiti & Karim R. Lakhani, The Truth About Blockchain, Jan.–Feb. 2017
HARV. BUS. REV. 1, 3–4 (2017), https://enterprisersproject.com/sites/default/files/th
e_truth_about_blockchain.pdf.
*
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massive investments for its broad applications in finance. 8
Meanwhile, academic and industry research on blockchain has
exploded since 2012. 9 Though blockchain applications have only
begun to surface, other sectors including healthcare, energy, and
government services stand to benefit from this technological
revolution. 10
New pilot projects suggest blockchain may also serve a
public health function as applied to food safety, 11 potentially
overlapping with WGS advances. Blockchain in the food industry
promises increased traceability of food products through the supply
chain, as well as reduced fraud and counterfeiting of food products.12
In 2017, Walmart and IBM began a collaboration to pilot blockchain
in the food supply chain to hasten responses and reduce waste during
an outbreak of foodborne illness. 13 Federal regulators in the U.S.
have gained interest in exploring this application of blockchain
technologies in the wake of two lettuce E. coli outbreaks during 2018
which suffered from traceability issues.14 Given their complementary
8
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Demystifying the Blockchain, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/business/dealbook/blockchain-technology.ht
ml.
9
Jesse Yli-Huumo et al., Where Is Current Research on Blockchain Technology?—
A Systematic Review, 11 PLOS ONE 10.1371, 9–10 (2016).
10
U.K. GOV’T OFFICE SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK
CHAIN 64–71 (2016), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technolog
y.pdf; Katharine Gammon, Experimenting with Blockchain: Can One Technology
Boost Both Data Integrity and Patients’ Pocketbooks?, 24 NATURE MED. 378, 381
(2018); Mike Orcutt, How Blockchain Could Give Us a Smarter Energy Grid, MIT
TECH. REV. (Oct. 16, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609077/howblockchain-could-give-us-a-smarter-energy-grid/.
11
See generally Frank Yiannas, A New Era of Food Transparency Powered by
Blockchain, 12 INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE, GLOBALIZATION 46 (2018).
12
Sylvian Charlebois, How Blockchain Technology Could Transform the Food
Industry, CONVERSATION (Dec. 19, 2017), https://theconversation.com/howblockchain-technology-could-transform-the-food-industry-89348.
13
See IBM Announces Major Blockchain Collaboration with Dole, Driscoll’s,
Golden State Foods, Kroger, McCormick and Company, McLane Company, Nestlé,
Tyson Foods, Unilever and Walmart to Address Food Safety Worldwide, IBM (Aug.
22, 2017), https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/53013.wss (detailing
IBM’s announcement in 2017 that it would begin a major blockchain collaboration
with various companies, including Walmart as well as blockchain’s suitability to
combat food waste problems) [hereinafter IBM Press Release].
14
Maggie Fox, The FDA Thinks Walmart May Have One Solution to Romaine
Lettuce Recalls, NBC NEWS (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/health/heal
th-news/fda-thinks-walmart-may-have-one-solution-romaine-lettuce-recallsn940826.

76

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

nature, industry-driven blockchain projects could soon converge
with government-based WGS infrastructure to provide a more
comprehensive approach to responding to foodborne illness.
Accomplishing this goal will require addressing regulatory and
technical hurdles.
This article illustrates opportunities and obstacles arising
from combining blockchain and WGS in food safety. Part I reviews
food safety regulatory infrastructure in the U.S. and recent advances
in WGS. Part II describes the rise of blockchain and its application
in the food supply chain. Part III presents the promise of successfully
combining blockchain and WGS tools alongside governance
challenges and opportunities, pointing to soft law approaches
including voluntary regulatory programs and technical standards as
a potential path forward.
II. Food Safety Oversight and Whole Genome
Sequencing
Ensuring food safety and preventing foodborne illness
represent common, pervasive public health challenges for every
nation and state. 15 Nearly 50 million individuals in the U.S. become
ill after exposure to contaminated food products in a single year.16
Food poisoning may produce more mild symptoms of gastric distress
but can also yield potentially fatal liver, kidney, and neurological
complications. 17 In turn, foodborne illnesses in the U.S. result in
128,000 hospitalizations and 3,000 mortalities annually. 18 Globally,
food poisoning strikes 600 million individuals, resulting in 420,000

See INST. MED., ADDRESSING FOODBORNE THREATS TO HEALTH: POLICIES,
PRACTICES, AND GLOBAL COORDINATION 3 (2006) (“Ensuring the safety of food is a
long-standing and critical objective of public health. The estimate that millions of
Americans—whose food is among the safest on earth—are sickened by tainted food
each year attests to the need to further safeguard our food supply, while the mounting
threat of terrorism lends this mission a particular urgency.”).
16
See L. Hannah Gould et al., Surveillance for Foodborne Disease Outbreaks --United States, 2008, 60 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1197, 1197 (2011)
(“Foodborne agents cause an estimated 48 million illnesses annually in the United
States.”).
17
See Paul S. Mead et al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States., 5
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 607, 607 (1999) (“[S]ymptoms of foodborne illness
range from mild gastroenteritis.”).
18
Foodborne Illness and Germs, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb. 16,
2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html.
15
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fatalities. 19 Foodborne illness may have disparate impacts on
vulnerable groups, including minorities and people of lower
socioeconomic status, 20 suggesting health justice as a needed lens for
this public health hazard. 21 Consumers consistently rate food
poisoning among top food-related concerns, ahead of pesticides,
antibiotics, or allergens.22 The economic burden of foodborne illness
from common pathogens on the American healthcare system may
approach $78 billion per year. 23
The expansive scope of pathogens and food products
contributing to foodborne illness complicates oversight for
prevention and response. 24 Myriad species of microorganisms and
toxic metabolites lead to illness every year. Prominent pathogens are

Food Safety: Key Facts, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 31, 2017),
http://www.who.int/news-room/fact-sheets/detail/food-safety.
20
See Chryssa V. Deliganis, Death by Apple Juice: The Problem of Foodborne
Illness, the Regulatory Response, and Further Suggestions for Reform, 53 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 681, 686 (1998) (“Foodborne illness is particularly dangerous for those
without access to health care, including the homeless, migrant workers, and others
of low socioeconomic status.”); Jennifer J. Quinlan, Foodborne Illness Incidence
Rates and Food Safety Risks for Populations of Low Socioeconomic Status and
Minority Race/Ethnicity: A Review of the Literature, 10 INT’L J. ENVTL. RES. & PUB.
HEALTH 3634, 3645–46 (2013) (discussing the impact of “greater access to small,
independently operated food markets and fast-food/take-out restaurants” on
minorities’ increased food poisoning rates). Cf. K. L. Newman et al., The Impact of
Socioeconomic Status on Foodborne Illness in High-Income Countries: A
Systematic Review, 143 EPIDEMIOL. & INFECT. 2473, 2473 (2015) (finding that the
effect of socio-economic status, or SES, varies depending on the pathogen, but “the
majority of identified studies for Campylobacter, salmonellosis, and E. coli infection
showed an association between high SES and illness.”).
21
See generally Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Law as Social Justice, 24 CORNELL J. LAW
& PUB. POL’Y 47 (2014) (arguing that health law should be used as a tool for social
justice).
22
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, 2018 FOOD
& HEALTH SURVEY 49 (2018) (finding “[f]oodborne illness from bacteria” was
ranked as the most important food safety issue in 2018 more often than any other
choice); INTERNATIONAL FOOD INFORMATION COUNCIL FOUNDATION, 2014 FOOD &
HEALTH SURVEY 75 (2014).
23
See Scharff, supra note 2, at 123 (finding that the aggregated annual cost of
foodborne illness was $77.7 billion under its enhanced model). Cf. Sandra Hoffmann
et al., Annual Cost of Illness and Quality-Adjusted Life Year Losses in the United
States Due to 14 Foodborne Pathogens, 75 J. FOOD PROTECTION 1292, 1292 (2012)
(reporting an average of $14 billion annually as a result of only common pathogens).
24
See generally U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., BAD BUG BOOK: HANDBOOK OF
FOODBORNE PATHOGENIC MICROORGANISMS AND NATURAL TOXINS (2d ed. 2012)
(providing information about major food pathogens and discussing the related
oversight challenges) [hereinafter BAD BUG BOOK].
19
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bacterial or viral, including salmonella, E. coli, and norovirus.25
Parasites, protozoa, prions, and chemical toxins can also contaminate
food and cause illness. 26 Every year, multiple outbreaks in meat,
produce, and other types of consumables are investigated by federal
regulators. 27 Illness arising from all food types can give rise to
infection, hospitalization, and mortality.28 Moreover, contamination
vulnerabilities exist at all stages of the food supply chain, “from farm
to table.”29 Identifying the pathogen responsible and the origin of
contamination is a critical part of the response to an outbreak and
preventing future outbreaks, and thus promoting food safety more
broadly. 30 Difficulties in characterizing pathogens can arise from
food contaminated by multiple microorganisms. 31 Unfortunately,
determining the origin of an outbreak with current tools can require
a substantial amount of time, potentially enabling the outbreak to
propagate. 32
Federal law divides regulatory authority over food safety
between multiple agencies. 33 Recently boosted by the Food Safety
Modernization Act, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
primary responsibility for preventing and responding to food
25
Foodborne Illnesses and Germs, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb.
16, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/foodborne-germs.html.
26
See BAD BUG BOOK, supra note 24 (discussing the impact of each of these
categories of contaminants on food safety).
27
List of Multistate Foodborne Outbreak Investigations, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/multistateoutbreaks/outbreaks-list.html.
28
John A. Painter et al., Attribution of Foodborne Illnesses, Hospitalizations, and
Deaths to Food Commodities by using Outbreak Data, United States, 1998–2008,
19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 407, 410–13 (2013).
29
FED. FOOD SAFETY WORKING GROUP, PROGRESS REPORT 1 (2011),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/fswg_report_final.pdf.
30
Steps in a Foodborne Outbreak Investigation, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL &
PREVENTION (June 20, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/outbreaks/investigat
ing-outbreaks/investigations/detection.html. See also Sébastien Pouliot & Daniel A.
Sumner, Traceability, Liability, and Incentives for Food Safety and Quality, 90 AM.
J. AGRIC. ECON. 15, 24–25 (2008).
31
Marion Koopmans, Food-Borne Viruses from a Global Perspective, in INSTITUTE
OF MEDICINE, IMPROVING FOOD SAFETY THROUGH A ONE HEALTH APPROACH:
WORKSHOP SUMMARY 225, 225 (2012).
32
Il-Hoon Cho & Seockmo Ku, Current Technical Approaches for the Early
Detection of Foodborne Pathogens: Challenges and Opportunities, 18 INT’L J.
MOLECULAR SCI. 2078, 2079 (2017); IBM Food Trust: Trust and Transparency in
Our Food, IBM (2018), https://www.ibm.com/blockchain/solutions/food-trust (last
visited Apr. 11, 2019).
33
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, FOOD SAFETY: A NATIONAL STRATEGY IS
NEEDED TO ADDRESS FRAGMENTATION IN FEDERAL OVERSIGHT 6–7 (2017).
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contamination. 34 FDA wields various tools for ensuring food safety
including inspection, recalls, sampling, and voluntary destruction. 35
Complementing FDA jurisdiction, the Department of Agriculture’s
Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) has similar authority over
meat, poultry, and processed eggs. 36 The Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC) conducts food safety surveillance,
investigates multistate outbreaks, and coordinates state and local
public health actions. 37 These three federal agencies established the
Interagency Food Safety Analytics Collaboration (IFSAC) in 2011
to promote coordination and cooperation in identifying culpable
pathogens and contaminated food products. 38
Despite its multi-agency scheme, gaps in U.S. food safety
oversight remain. For example, of the nearly 50 million cases of
foodborne illness in the U.S. each year, the responsible pathogen has
historically only been identified in one fifth of the cases. 39 In 2011,
the FDA launched the “Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS)
Program” to enhance its food safety operations. 40 WGS methods
comprehensively decode the full genome of an organism, identifying
FDA Food Safety Modernization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-353, 124 Stat. 3885 (2011)
(amending the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399i
(2018)); see Debra M. Strauss, An Analysis of the FDA Food Safety Modernization
Act: Protection for Consumers and Boon for Business, 66 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 353,
354–55 (2011) (analyzing the new duties as well as the enhanced scope of FDA’s
authority created by FSMA).
35
See Deliganis, supra note 20, at 702–05 (considering the many tools available in
FDA’s arsenal); Food: Compliance & Enforcement, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Food/ComplianceEnforcement/default.htm
(discussing FDA’s authority to take action against “adulterated” or “misbranded”
foods); see also 21 U.S.C. §§ 321(f), 393(b)(2)(A) (2018).
36
21 U.S.C. §§ 451–72 (2019); 21 U.S.C. §§ 601–26 (2019); 21 U.S.C. §§ 1031–56
(2019).
37
21 U.S.C. § 2224; CDC and Food Safety, U.S. CTR. DIS. CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/foodsafety/cdc-and-food-safety.html. See
generally U.S. CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, SURVEILLANCE FOR
FOODBORNE DISEASE OUTBREAKS, UNITED STATES: 2016 ANNUAL REPORT (2016).
38
INTERAGENCY FOOD SAFETY ANALYTICS COLLABORATION, STRATEGIC PLAN:
CALENDAR YEAR 2017-2021 2–3 (2017).
39
See Elaine Scallan et al., Foodborne Illness Acquired in the United States—Major
Pathogens, 17 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 7, 7 (2001) (finding 9.4 million cases of
foodborne illness caused by known, common pathogens); see also Elaine Scallan et
al, Foodborne Illness Acquired in the United States—Unspecified Agents, 17
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DIS. 16, 16 (2011) (finding 38.4 million cases of foodborne
illness caused by unknown pathogens).
40
Eric L. Stevens et al., The Public Health Impact of a Publicly Available,
Environmental Database of Microbial Genomes, 8 FRONTIERS MICROBIOLOGY 1, 2
(2017).
34
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the organism by comparing the data produced through sequencing to
reference genomic datasets. 41 With the costs of WGS technology
falling, 42 the FDA program calls on laboratories to characterize the
full genome of microbes obtained from food, environmental, and
clinical samples in their local areas. 43 The GenomeTrakr platform
serves as a key tool in the FDA Whole Genome Sequencing Project
by providing an international reference database of pathogen
genomes. 44 GenomeTrakr enables public health officials to infer the
origin of contamination in food products by comparing the genomes
of new outbreak pathogens, obtained from WGS, to references in the
database from various geographical locations. 45 In 2013, CDC
announced its existing PulseNet network of genomic food safety
laboratories would begin collecting WGS data.46 PulseNet aims to
recognize outbreaks earlier by finding common strains of specific
pathogens in different clinical cases and whole genome data should
augment these efforts. 47 FSIS contributes to both CDC’s PulseNet
and FDA’s GenomeTrakr, and, in 2017, indicated interest in
conducting its own analyses of pathogen genomic data. 48 An
overview of the efforts of IFSAC agencies to implement WGS
techniques in food safety are described in Figure 1.

Jenny C. Taylor et al., Factors Influencing Success of Clinical Genome
Sequencing Across a Broad Spectrum of Disorders, 47 NATURE GENETICS 717, 717
(2015).
42
Xavier Didelot et al., Transforming Clinical Microbiology with Bacterial Genome
Sequencing, 13 NATURE REV. GENETICS 601, 610 (2012).
43
Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) Program, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Feb.
15, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/food/foodscienceresearch/wholegenomesequencing
programwgs/.
44
GenomeTrakr Fast Facts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/WholeGenomeSequencingProgra
mWGS/ucm403550.htm.
45
Id.
46
PulseNet: Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS), U.S. CTR. DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION (Feb. 11, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/pathogens/wgs.html.
47
Id.; Fast Facts About PulseNet, U.S. CTR. DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Feb.
16, 2016), https://www.cdc.gov/pulsenet/about/fast-facts.html.
48
Use of Whole Genome Sequence Analysis to Improve Food Safety and Public
Health, 82 Fed. Reg. 44378 (Sept. 22, 2017).
41
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Figure 1. IFSAC Agencies and WGS Initiatives

Early evidence suggests these WGS methods for pathogen
characterization may improve the response capacity of food safety
regulators. 49 FDA reports cases showing WGS affords the ability to
identify and distinguish between problematic pathogens in the food
system, even in products with ingredients from diverse geographic
locations. 50 In 2013, CDC launched a pilot project to detect food
contaminated with listeria using WGS techniques.51 Initial results
demonstrate that WGS methods enabled public health officials to
identify as many as 50% more related cases of foodborne listeria in
a year and reduced the average number of cases reported per outbreak
by up to 50%. 52 The listeria project points to significant possible
public health and economic savings by reducing the burden of
foodborne illness. 53 The expanding international adoption of
PulseNet and GenomeTrakr should allow for further improved
results. 54 Moreover, WGS systems may offer a platform for public
health officials to monitor the food supply chain and intervene earlier
49
See E. Kurt Lienau et al., Identification of a Salmonellosis Outbreak by Means of
Molecular Sequencing, 364 NEW ENG. J. MED. 981, 981 (2011) (discussing how
genome sequencing methods were used in identifying a salmonella outbreak in
2009-2010).
50
Examples of How FDA Has Used Whole Genome Sequencing of Foodborne
Pathogens for Regulatory Purposes, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 16, 2017),
https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/WholeGenomeSequencingProgra
mWGS/ucm422075.htm.
51
Brendan R. Jackson et al., Implementation of Nationwide Real-time Wholegenome Sequencing to Enhance Listeriosis Outbreak Detection and Investigation,
63 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DIS. 380, 380–81 (2016).
52
Id. at 382 (comparing data from the year prior to WGS implementation to year 2
of WGS use).
53
Robert L. Scharff et al., An Economic Evaluation of PulseNet: A Network for
Foodborne Disease Surveillance, 50 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. S66, S66 (2016).
54
See Marc W. Allard et al., Practical Value of Food Pathogen Traceability through
Building a Whole-Genome Sequencing Network and Database, 54 J. CLINICAL
MICROBIOLOGY 1975, 1975 (2016); Celine Nadon et al., PulseNet International:
Vision for the Implementation of Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) for Global
Food-Borne Disease Surveillance, 22 EUR. SURVEILLANCE 1.
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than otherwise possible to mitigate the spread of detected
pathogens. 55
Despite advances in WGS food regulation, gaps exist in
industry and regulatory entities’ abilities to trace food through the
supply chain. 56 Paper documentation in the food supply chain
continues to be used despite inefficiency. 57 No comprehensive digital
system exists to track food products through the supply chain,
slowing down regulatory responses to outbreaks of foodborne
illnesses. 58 The summer 2018 regulatory investigation of an E. coli
outbreak in lettuce from Arizona lasted for weeks, 59 illustrating long
response times despite access to CDC and FDA genomic databases.
Challenges in traceability can lead to significant waste as well. For
example, after struggling to identify the source of an E. coli outbreak
in November 2018, CDC and FDA warned consumers and
distributors to discard all romaine lettuce from all producers. 60 This
extensive response to the uncertain source of contamination further
raised objections from farmers feeling they were unfairly forced to

Proactive Approaches of Whole Genome Sequencing Technology, U.S. FOOD &
DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceResearch/W
holeGenomeSequencingProgramWGS/ucm422077.htm.
56
See King et al., supra note 5 at 160, 170.
57
Myo Min Aung & Yoon Seok Chang, Traceability in a Food Supply Chain: Safety
and Quality Perspectives, 39 FOOD CONTROL 172, 181 (2014).
58
Sylvain Charlebois et al., Comparison of Global Food Traceability Regulations
and Requirements, 13 COMPREHENSIVE REV. FOOD SCI. & FOOD SAFETY 1104, 1108
(2014).
59
Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on Developments in the
Romaine Outbreak Investigation U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (June 28, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm612187.ht
m.
60
CDC Food Safety Alert: E. coli Outbreak Linked to Romaine Lettuce, U.S. CTR.
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.cdc.gov/media/rele
ases/2018/s1120-ecoli-romain-lettuce.html; Statement from FDA Commissioner
Scott Gottlieb, M.D., On the Current Romaine Lettuce E. coli Outbreak
Investigation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN (Nov. 26, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/Ne
wsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm626716.htm [hereinafter FDA
Update]. CDC even recommended consumers discard lettuce when unsure if lettuce
was romaine. Id. FDA Commissioner Gottlieb expressed frustration that the
contaminated food could not be well identified or traced to specific producers. See
Susan Scutti, Don’t Eat Romaine Lettuce, CDC Urges Amid E. coli Concerns, CNN
(Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/20/health/romaine-lettuce-e-colicdc/index.html. Some commentators were wry in their description of the regulatory
inefficiency. See, e.g., Tom McKay, CDC: Do Not Eat Any Romaine Lettuce Until
We Can Figure Out What the Hell Is Going On, GIZMODO (Nov. 20, 2018),
https://gizmodo.com/cdc-do-not-eat-any-romaine-lettuce-until-we-can-figure-1830
580265.
55
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carry the costs of traceability issues.61 New approaches for digitally
managing food safety data and tracing food products will be needed
to complement other advances in preventing and responding to
foodborne illness.
III. Blockchain and Applications in the Food Supply
Chain
Improving traceability in the food supply chain may require
novel tools. Opportunities to optimize and streamline the food safety
infrastructure and to trace contaminated foods identified by WGS
through the supply chain may arise with new technological
approaches offered by blockchain. 62 These approaches offer
platforms for a host of participants to collectively build a record of
data while ensuring that only one, authoritative version exists at any
time. 63
Blockchain represents a large category of upcoming
technologies anchored in the larger umbrella of distributed ledger
technologies. 64 Blockchain systems have gained substantial attention
by stakeholders from myriad industries due to several key elements

See Martin Finucane & Katie Camero, Farmer Worries CDC Has Gone Too Far
With Its Lettuce Warning, BOSTON GLOBE (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.bostonglob
e.com/metro/2018/11/23/has-cdc-gone-too-far-with-its-lettuce-warning/F6WaKxS
WQ81AsZtg8lLjuO/story.html. Some groups began labeling lettuce by its location
and date of harvesting in response. Jesse Newman, Lettuce Producers Prepare
Labeling Changes in Response to New E. coli Outbreak, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 26,
2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/lettuce-producersprepare-labeling-changes-inresponse-to-newe-coli-outbreak-1543255194?mod=hp_lead_pos10.
62
See generally Massimo Di Pierro, What Is the Blockchain?, 19 COMPUTING SCI.
& ENGINEERING 92 (2017); Explainer: What Is a blockchain?, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr.
23, 2018), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/610833/explainer-what-is-a-block
chain/.
63
See, e.g., Ryan Surujnath, Off the Chain: A Guide to Blockchain Derivatives
Markets and the Implications on Systemic Risk Notes, 22 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN.
L. 257, 262 (2017) (discussing the efficiency of blockchains compared to a
centralized system); see Sorkin, supra note 8 (comparing blockchains to the use of
Google Docs).
64
WORLD BANK GROUP, DISTRIBUTED LEDGER TECHNOLOGY (DLT) AND
BLOCKCHAIN 1 (2017), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/1779115137140
62215/pdf/122140-WP-PUBLIC-Distributed-Ledger-Technology-and-BlockchainFintech-Notes.pdf; R3, BLOCKCHAIN BYTE: WHAT IS THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN A
BLOCKCHAIN AND A DISTRIBUTED LEDGER? 2–3 (2017), https://www.finra.org/sites
/default/files/2017_BC_Byte.pdf.
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of the technology. 65 First, blockchain acts as a ledger or recording
system for data or transactions. 66 Data are loaded onto the ledger in
discrete “blocks” and coupled to the prior block, forming a “chain”
with a timeline. 67 Second, blocks are placed on the ledger
chronologically and users can view all blocks dating back to the
original. 68 Third, that ledger is distributed across all nodes in the
system, signifying that all users have a copy of the record. 69 Finally,
verified blocks become immunized from changes by individual
users, because altering an old block requires a majority of nodes to
agree on the change. 70
Classifying blockchains can occur in multiple manners,
though a useful lens comes from viewing systems as permissioned or
permissionless, public or private (as in Figure 2). 71 Permissionless
blockchains enable any party to add a block to the chain, where
permissioned systems require users to first obtain prior authorization
from an administrator. 72 The public-private dimension instead
distinguishes whether anyone can access and review data stored on
the ledger, or if only authorized entities can access the information.73
While Bitcoin functions as a public, permissionless system without
a central authority, businesses looking for more top-down

The National Academies describes blockchain as “a technology meant to achieve
and unalterable, decentralized, public, append-only log of transactions, without any
single authority in a position to change the log.” NAT’L ACAD. SCI., ENG’G, & MED.,
SECURING THE VOTE: PROTECTING AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 103 (2018).
66
See NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 6, at 13–1717 (explaining the ways blockchain can
track data); Konstantinos Christidis & Michael Devetsikiotis, Blockchains and
Smart Contracts for the Internet of Things, 4 IEEE ACCESS 2292, 2293 (2016).
67
NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra note 6, at 13–17; Christidis & Devetsikiotis, supra note 66,
at 2293; see also Wessel Reijers, Fiachra O’Brolcháin & Paul Haynes, Governance
in Blockchain Technologies & Social Contract Theories, 1 LEDGER 134, 136 (2016).
68
X. Xu et al., A Taxonomy of Blockchain-Based Systems for Architecture Design,
in 2017 IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOFTWARE ARCHITECTURE (ICSA)
243, 244 (2017).
69
WORLD BANK GROUP, supra note 64, at 5–6; see also R3, supra note 64, at 2
(noting that while blockchains are distributed, they can be built as both centralized
or decentralized systems).
70
Nir Kshetri, Blockchain’s Roles in Strengthening Cybersecurity and Protecting
Privacy, 41 TELECOMM. POL’Y 1027, 1027–28 (2017); see Yli-Huumo et al., supra
note 9, at 3 (discussing the process of forming blockchain).
71
Weizhi Meng et al., When Intrusion Detection Meets Blockchain Technology: A
Review, 6 IEEE ACCESS 10179, 10183 (2018).
72
See NIST REPORT, supra note 6, at 5–6.
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See Meng et al., supra note 71, at 10183.
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approaches generally select private and permissioned schemes.74
These characteristics may change the method of verifying blocks
before being added to the immutable chain, called consensus
models. 75 Proof of work consensus models have become
commonplace in permissionless blockchains such as Bitcoin, which
competitively reward the first participating node to verify blocks by
solving algorithmic “puzzles.” 76 However, consensus protocols
better suited for permissioned systems may provide useful
alternatives to proof of work models and their high fiscal and energy
costs. 77 For greater flexibility, data recorded on the distributed ledger
and associated applications can be stored on- or off-chain. 78
Figure 2. Basic Blockchain Structural Classifications 79

Praveen Jayachandran, The Difference Between Public and Private Blockchain,
IBM BLOG (May 31, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2017/05/thedifference-between-public-and-private-blockchain/.
75
For a comprehensive review of consensus mechanisms, see NIST Rᴇᴘᴏʀᴛ, supra
note 6, at 18–24.
76
Id. at 19–20.
77
See id. at 21–24; CATHERINE MULLIGAN ET. AL. BLOCKCHAIN BEYOND THE HYPE
5, WORLD ECON. F. (2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/48423_Whether_Block
chain_WP.pdf.
78
See Jose Luis Bellod Cisneros et al., Public Health Surveillance using
Decentralized Technologies, 1 BLOCKCHAIN HEALTHCARE TODAY 1, 7 (2018).
79
Adapted from information in NIST Report, supra note 6, at 5–6; Meng et al.,
supra note 71, at 10183.
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Blockchain has gained a reputation as a financial technology,
with its popularization through Bitcoin and the oscillating market
value of cryptocurrencies since then. 80 However, blockchain
applications also offer substantial promise in the health care and
public health sectors. 81 Perhaps best documented is the anticipated
application of blockchain to power electronic health records to
enhance privacy and portability. 82 But various other opportunities to
advance public health through blockchain exist, including tracing
medical products through the supply chain. 83 Converging with the
interest in blockchain for logistics, 84 blockchain has been proposed
as a system to track prescription opioids through the drug supply
chain. 85
The intersection of blockchain, supply chain logistics, and
public health has recently sparked attention for its applications in
food safety. In August 2017, IBM and food industry giants including
Walmart announced a partnership to pilot a blockchain-based food
surveillance system. 86 The permissioned IBM platform aims to
record data throughout the supply chain for individual food batches
including location of origin, identification numbers, expiration dates,
shipping records, and other processing information. 87 Notably, the
Walmart-IBM collaboration promises to identify the source of an
See JERRY BRITO & ANDREA CASTILLO, BITCOIN: A PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS,
MERCATUS CTR. 1–2, 6 (2016), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/gmu_bitcoin
_042516_webv3_0.pdf.
81
Ron Ribitzky et al., Pragmatic, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Blockchain and
Distributed Ledger Technology: Paving the Future for Healthcare, 1 BLOCKCHAIN
HEALTHCARE TODAY 1, 5–9 (2018), https://blockchainhealthcaretoday.com/index.p
hp/journal/article/view/24/21.
82
See Gammon, supra note 10, at 378–79.
83
Liam Bell et al., Applications of Blockchain Within Healthcare, 1 BLOCKCHAIN
HEALTHCARE TODAY 1, 2 (2018), https://blockchainhealthcaretoday.com/index.php
/journal/article/view/8/29.
84
See WORLD ECON. FORUM, TRADE TECH – A NEW AGE FOR TRADE AND SUPPLY
CHAIN FINANCE 11 (2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/White_Paper_Trade_Te
ch_report_2018.pdf.
85
Susan Galer, Betting on Blockchain as a Miracle Cure for the $78 Billion Opioid
Crisis, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/sap/2017/09/12/bett
ing-on-blockchain-as-a-miracle-cure-for-the-78b-opioid-crisis/.
86
IBM Press Release, supra note 13.
87
Brigid McDermott, Improving Confidence in Food Safety with IBM Blockchain,
IBM BLOCKCHAIN BLOG (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/blockchain/2
017/09/improving-confidence-in-food-safety-with-ibm-blockchain/. (In general,
relevant supply chain data loaded on the blockchain may include “time, location,
price, parties involved, and other relevant information when an item changes
ownership.”); See Kshetri, supra note 70, at 1034.
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outbreak “in seconds rather than days or weeks.”88 The blockchain
application could give retailers the confidence to only discard food
products from the affected farms, rather than wasting considerably
more food. 89 By September 2018, Walmart announced it would
retain the program permanently to trace lettuce products.90 Walmart
will require direct suppliers and over 100 upstream farms to comply
over the course of 2019. 91
Though no public data on the project have been released, the
Walmart-IBM pilot offers a valuable case study in leveraging
distributed ledger technology to promote public health. 92 The
preliminary reports of success for blockchain in the food supply
chain will likely draw further interest from industry competitors and
regulators alike for uses beyond leafy greens. 93 In November 2018,
the French distributor Auchan SA announced its own blockchain
See IBM Press Release, supra note 13.
IBM Food Trust Expands Blockchain Network to Foster a Safer, More
Transparent and Efficient Global Food System, IBM (Oct. 8, 2018),
https://newsroom.ibm.com/2018-10-08-IBM-Food-Trust-Expands-BlockchainNetwork-to-Foster-a-Safer-More-Transparent-and-Efficient-Global-Food-System;
see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
90
Matt Smith, In Wake of Romaine E. coli Scare, Walmart Deploys Blockchain to
Track Leafy Greens, WALMART , https://news.walmart.com/_news_/2018/09/24/inwake-of-romaine-e-coli-scare-walmart-deploys-blockchain-to-track-leafy-greens
(last accessed Apr. 8, 2019).
91
Michael Corkery & Nathaniel Popper, From Farm to Blockchain: Walmart Tracks
Its Lettuce, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/bu
siness/walmart-blockchain-lettuce.html; Kim S. Nash, Walmart Requires Lettuce,
Spinach Suppliers to Join Blockchain, WSJ BLOG (Sept. 24, 2018),
https://blogs.wsj.com/cio/2018/09/24/walmart-requires-lettuce-spinach-suppliersto-join-blockchain/.
92
The late 2018 expansion of the pilot to include European food distributor
Carrefour may open more opportunities for evaluation. See Food Traceability:
Carrefour, a Blockchain Pioneer in Europe, Has Joined the IBM Food Trust
Platform to Take Action on a Global Scale (Oct. 8, 2018),
http://www.carrefour.com/current-news/food-traceability-carrefour-a-blockchainpioneer-in-europe-has-joined-the-ibm-food. However, should the pilot fail and these
industry leaders abandon a blockchain approach, this may ripple into the food supply
chain industry. See Christian Catalini & Catherine Tucker, When Early Adopters
Don’t Adopt, 357 SCIENCE 135, 135–36 (2017).
93
See From Shore to Plate: Tracking Tuna on the Blockchain, PROVENANCE (July
15,
2016),
https://www.provenance.org/tracking-tuna-on-the-blockchain.
Contamination in other common food products also cause public health burdens, as
the 2018 FSIS recalls on raw beef indicate. See News Release, U.S. Food Safety &
Inspection Serv., JBS Tolleson, Inc. Recalls Raw Beef Products Due to Possible
Salmonella Newport Contamination (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps
/portal/fsis/topics/recalls-and-public-health-alerts/recall-casearchive/archive/2018/recall-085-2018-EXP-release.
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pilot to trace meat and vegetables through the supply chain. 94 The
World Wildlife Fund has launched a blockchain project to trace tuna
through the supply chain in Australia, New Zealand, and Fiji.95
Insurers may support the drive towards blockchain, given the
potential for lowering fiscal risk in the food supply chain.96
Publicized foodborne illness outbreaks may add pressure to adopt
blockchain, with some coverage casting blockchain as a potential
solution to traceability issues arising from the November 2018 E. coli
outbreak. 97 CDC and FDA already collaborate with IBM on
blockchain applications in public health, 98 and may take new steps to
infuse their food safety operations with blockchain. 99 While vital to
acknowledge that blockchain technology cannot solve all
problems, 100 its potential to reduce foodborne illness will likely drive
further experimentation and implementation.
IV. Governance Considerations for Combining
Blockchain and Genomics
Two rising trends in food safety may soon converge. On one
side, food regulators have begun to implement WGS methods and
databases to enhance responses to foodborne illness, aiming also to

94
Globalized blockchain: Auchan implements food traceability technology on
international scale, FOODINGREDIENTSFIRST (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.foodingr
edientsfirst.com/news/globalized-blockchain-auchan-implements-foodtraceability-technology-on-international-scale.html
95
New Blockchain Project Has Potential to Revolutionize Seafood Industry, WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND (Jan 8, 2018), https://www.wwf.org.nz/what_we_do/marine/blockc
hain_tuna_project/.
96
See David Hundeyin, Australian Insurer Announces Blockchain Trial for Beef
Export Supply Chain, CCN (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/australianinsurer-announces-blockchain-trial-for-beef-export-supply-chain/.
97
See Bruce Y. Lee, What Blockchain Has to Do with Turkey, Romaine Lettuce, and
Food Safety, FORBES (Nov. 28, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/brucelee/2018/
11/28/what-does-blockchain-have-to-do-with-turkey-lettuce-and-food-safety/#41fb
5c7b7399.
98
Steven Melendez, How IBM and the CDC Are Testing Blockchain to Track Health
Issues Like the Opioid Crisis, FAST COMPANY (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.fastcom
pany.com/90231255/how-ibm-and-the-cdc-are-testing-blockchain-to-track-healthissues-like-the-opioid-crisis; IBM Watson Health Announces Collaboration to Study
the Use of Blockchain Technology for Secure Exchange of Healthcare Data, IBM
(Jan. 11, 2017), https://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/51394.wss.
99
See Fox, supra note 14.
100
R. Jᴇꜱꜱᴇ MᴄWᴀᴛᴇʀꜱ, THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE 18, WORLD
ECON. FORUM (2016), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_The_future_of_financ
ial_infrastructure.pdf.
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augment prevention efforts. 101 On the other, private industry is
developing blockchain capabilities for data recording to streamline
regulatory compliance and minimize discarded products during an
outbreak. Blockchain offers strengths to cover the weaknesses of
WGS, enabling officials to trace contaminated food products through
the supply chain and potentially increasing data liquidity. 102 In turn,
whole genomic sequencing methods should enable determining the
exact type of pathogen and its geographical origin, when blockchain
is limited to tracing backwards rather than starting at the beginning.
If combined effectively, the nexus of blockchain and WGS could
enhance the capacity of public health actors to respond to and prevent
foodborne illness mortality and morbidity.
More specifically, benefits might accrue from fusing the
power of WGS methods and government reference databases with
the advantages of blockchain containing an authoritative,
timestamped, readily searchable record (as depicted in Figure 3).
Since blockchain systems likely cannot store the amount of data
constituting a full genomic sequence, 103 useful information about
each sequenced organism including species and location could
instead be recorded directly on the chain. 104 The full DNA sequence
of pathogens could instead be stored “off the chain,”105 with a central
authority providing permission to access the full sequence data on
request by public health officials. In one possible scheme, during an
outbreak of foodborne illness, pathogen information from clinical
samples could be compared to reference databases and on-chain data
to narrow the search for a matching organism. Permissioned access
to off-chain genomic sequences could then be used to infer where the
contamination originated and which downstream facilities were
affected.

See Proactive Applications of Whole Genome Sequencing Technology, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.fda.gov/Food/FoodScienceRes
earch/WholeGenomeSequencingProgramWGS/ucm422077.htm.
102
Halil Ibrahim Ozercan et al., Realizing the Potential of Blockchain Technologies
in Genomics, 28 GENOME RES. 1255, 1262 (2018).
103
See Nadon et al., supra note 54, at 4–5.
104
See Bellod Cisneros et al., supra note 78, at 5.
105
William J. Gordon & Christian Catalini, Blockchain Technology for Healthcare:
Facilitating the Transition to Patient-Driven Interoperability, 16 COMPUTATIONAL
& STRUCTURAL BIOTECH. J. 224, 228 (2018).
101
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Figure 3. Potential Food Safety Benefits in Integrating
Blockchain and WGS

Beyond public health benefits, incentives exist to encourage
private actors to pursue the integration of blockchain and WGS in
food safety operations. Despite upfront costs in developing or leasing
the blockchain platform, the Walmart case study suggests substantial
potential savings for food distribution corporations by increasing
response time to contamination in food products. 106 The heightened
agility and specificity offered by combining WGS and blockchain
should therefore promote greater internal savings and less waste for
industry actors. More targeted responses to contamination should
also protect farming entities from the economic impact of distributors
discarding even uncontaminated food products when faced with
uncertainty about the source and path of an outbreak. 107 The potential
for blockchain and WGS combination systems to streamline and
speed compliance should reduce or mitigate regulatory penalties
resulting from contamination. 108
Though offering great promise, excitement for a pragmatic
new public health tool should be tempered by a realistic
understanding of remaining technical, corporate, and governance
challenges. 109 Whether developers can adequately scale up the
blockchain supply chain pilot projects remains an open question, and
See IBM Press Release, supra note 13.
See, e.g., Finucane & Camero, supra note 61.
108
See generally, EMILY M. LANZA, CONG. RES. SERV., R43927, FOOD SAFETY
ISSUES: FDA JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS (2015), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/
R43927.pdf.
109
See CHRIS JAIKARAN, CONG. RES. SERV., R45116, BLOCKCHAIN: BACKGROUND
AND POLICY ISSUES 9 (2018), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R45116.pdf.
106
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may require years to accomplish.110 Scaling up may also come with
added risks of cybersecurity vulnerability. 111 Further increasing
adoption of and participation in FDA and CDC pathogen sequencing
programs will take time and appropriate standardization of the
technology. 112 Deploying blockchain and WGS sequencing
technologies at all nodes in a food supply chain will demand
substantial time, resources, and, likely, political capital. Notably,
while implementing blockchain would allow for improved supply
chain management and mitigate the extent and duration of foodborne
illness outbreaks, it would not directly resolve existing food safety
issues leading to contamination.113
Moreover, technical decisions about the most appropriate
architecture for a blockchain will be required and have regulatory
implications. Blockchain-powered food supply chain systems
promise to reduce fraud by holding all users accountable for the data
they enter. 114 However, this benefit is only possible from within a
permissioned blockchain system, as all users creating blocks must be
identifiable to gain permissioned access. 115 Permissionless systems
could create insurmountable challenges in data integrity and
compliance by enabling any party to add blocks to the ledger.116

110
Evelyn Cheng, For All the Hype, Blockchain Applications Are Still Years, Even
Decades Away, CNBC (June 4, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/06/04/for-allthe-hype-blockchain-applications-are-still-years-even-decades-away.html; Melissa
Gilmour, Blockchain for Supply Chains—More Hype Than Reality?, SWEETBRIDGE
(June 11, 2018), https://blog.sweetbridge.com/blockchain-for-supply-chains-morehype-than-reality-150f9962b80c.
111
See WORLD ECON. FORUM, supra note 84, at 11. See also, Aleksey K. Fedorov et.
al., Quantum Computers Put Blockchain Security at Risk, 563 NATURE 465, 465–67
(2018); Quantum Computers Pose an Imminent Threat to Bitcoin Security, MIT
TECH. REV. (Nov. 8, 2017), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/609408/quantumcomputers-pose-imminent-threat-to-bitcoin-security/.
112
Jacob Moran-Gilad, Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS) for Food-Borne
Pathogen Surveillance and Control – Taking the Pulse, 22 EUROSURVEILLANCE
30547, 30547 (2017).
113
Jenny Splitter, Walmart’s Blockchain Offers Tech Fix, But There’s More to Leafy
Greens Than Data, FORBES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jennysp
litter/2018/09/28/walmarts-blockchain-offers-tech-fix-but-theres-more-to-leafygreens-than-data/.
114
Nir Kshetri, Blockchain Systems Are Tracking Food Safety and Origins, THE
CONVERSATION (Nov. 21, 2018 6:49 AM), https://theconversation.com/blockchainsystems-are-tracking-food-safety-and-origins-106491.
115
See NIST Report, supra note 6, at 5–6.
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Les Wilkinson et. al., Blockchain Meets Healthcare: Understanding the Business
Model and Implementing Initiatives, 2017 ACC DOCKET 57, 59, https://www.nelso
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Permissioned systems could also avoid proof of work consensus
mechanisms, avoiding substantial energy consumption and
environmental impacts upon scaling up. 117
If permissioned platforms advance, questions may arise
about whether industry or government entities will hold centralized
control of the blockchain to grant permission to participate and add
blocks. 118 The potential public health utility and existing government
stewardship over WGS databases may support placing public actors
in control of permissioned blockchains. Federal regulators
administering the permissioned systems may maximize
accountability for industry and the effectiveness of enforcement
actions. 119 The possibility of deliberate food contamination in acts of
agroterrorism 120 may provide further rationale for federal
government control. Yet, the technology and supply chain industries
will likely lead the efforts to build blockchain infrastructure in the
food supply chain. 121 Despite incentivizes to minimize fiscal harm
from contamination, blockchain development will require private
firms to expend notable resources in a competitive market.
Accordingly, economic factors will likely disincentivize industry
members who have invested the most in creating and maintaining
platforms to cede control of their permissioned systems to federal
food safety regulators. 122

nmullins.com/storage/4db2ba62b5531942d89ab659e2921280.pdf (“Depending on
the industry, knowing who is on the network may not only be desired but legally
required.”).
117
See Camilo Mora et al., Bitcoin Emissions Alone Could Push Global Warming
Above 2°C, 2018 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 1.
118
Australia recently announced a pilot project for a national blockchain to act as a
platform for blockchain based commerce in Australia, highlighting the possibility of
a state-run blockchain for commercial and potentially regulatory functions. See
AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL BLOCKCHAIN, https://www.australiannationalblockchain.co
m/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
119
Direct federal control would facilitate more traditional command and control
regulation, often perceived as more accountable, transparent, and directly
enforceable. See Diana M. Bowman & Graeme A. Hodge, ‘Governing’
Nanotechnology Without Government?, 35 SCI. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 477 (2008).
120
U.S GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-310, HIGH RISK SERIES: AN
UPDATE 28–29 (2007), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07310.pdf.
121
Bernard Marr, How Blockchain Will Transform the Supply Chain and Logistics
Industry, FORBES (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018
/03/23/how-blockchain-will-transform-the-supply-chain-and-logistics-industry/#1f
be6eb45fec (highlighting use cases all arising from private industry).
122
REDUCING THE RISK OF POLICY FAILURE: CHALLENGES FOR REGULATORY
COMPLIANCE 18, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. (2000), https://www.oecd.org/
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Further governance challenges could arise in the decision for
public or private blockchain architecture. A public blockchain could
enable public health officials globally to monitor food safety in the
supply chain without procedural constraints on gaining access to the
blockchain, likely leading to improved foodborne illness responses.
The open-access model of a public ledger may also offer the most
pragmatic interface between blockchain and the growing
international adoption of GenomeTrakr and the PulseNet
International network of WGS public health laboratories. 123
However, a public design would also enable any other party to view
data on the chain, including competitors, yielding corporate
confidentiality dilemmas.124 Accordingly, businesses generally seek
to utilize private blockchains. 125 Off-chain storage of confidential
data could ease such concerns, but off-chain storage can carry
independent security vulnerabilities. 126 Though a public blockchain
could maximize transparency in supply chain governance, 127
business incentives may resist regulatory moves granting
competitors access to confidential supply chain and compliance data.
The presence of competition in crafting blockchain
platforms for the food supply chain also highlights the potential for
interoperability challenges. 128 Given the competitive pressures to
protect confidential data, each supply chain manager will likely
gov/regulatory-policy/1910833.pdf (illustrating how corporate “[c]ompliance rates
are lower when regulation does not fit well with existing market practices or is not
supported by cultural norms and civic institutions.”).
123
See Nadon et al., supra note 54, at 10.
124
See Charlebois, supra note 12. Developing new tools for blockchain platforms,
including zero knowledge proofs, may mitigate the disclosure of confidential data
by enabling parties to reveal no more data than is required for a given transaction.
See Vinayaka Pandit & Pankaj Dayama, Privacy in Blockchain Collaboration with
Zero Knowledge Proofs, IBM BLOG (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/bl
ockchain/2019/01/privacy-in-blockchain-collaboration-with-zero-knowledge-proof
s/.
125
See Jayachandran, supra note 74.
126
Ana Reyna et al., On Blockchain and Its Integration with IoT. Challenges and
Opportunities, 88 FUTURE GENERATION COMPUTER SYSTEMS 173, 177 (2018).
127
Benjamin Herzberg, Blockchain: The Solution for Transparency in Product
Supply Chains, PROVENANCE (Nov. 21, 2015), https://www.provenance.org/whitepa
per.
128
As in health care, blockchain is not an inherent solution to interoperability and
issues will likely develop when blockchain platforms are implemented. Raj Sharma,
Don’t Look to Blockchain to Solve Healthcare’s Interoperability Woes, FORBES
(Sept. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2018/09/18/dontlook-to-blockchain-to-solve-healthcares-interoperability-woes/#7a19bd5e6eab.

94

JOURNAL OF FOOD LAW & POLICY

[Vol.15

obtain and operate their own blockchain with limited incentives to
ensure it could interface with others. 129 Moreover, firms will lack
incentives to switch to a new, more centralized blockchain platform
once committed to one, as logged data will remain on the original
blockchain and protocols to transfer data to a new blockchain remain
limited. 130 Food blockchains lacking interoperability may complicate
efforts by public health officials to effectively track foodborne illness
outbreaks and apply WGS data, particularly when outbreaks span
facilities and regions involving multiple supply chains. 131 Food
products packaged with multiple types of ingredients, 132 potentially
tracked through different blockchains, may exacerbate
interoperability challenges. 133 Government pressure or mandates to
create interoperable platforms could be opposed by industry, citing
potential anticompetitive effects. 134
No simple solution exists to these governance challenges,
given the conflicting public health and business interests in designing
and deploying a blockchain to integrate with existing WGS
operations. Overly aggressive actions or requirements by regulators,
even made in the interest of public health, may disincentivize
industry from ever developing the blockchain platforms.135
Command and control regulatory approaches administered by a
central government may suffer from perceived or real inefficiency,

Absent standardization or other pressures, blockchain developers will have
significant latitude to build unique platforms to the specifications of individual
clients, likely resulting in interoperability issues. See DAVID SCHATSKY, ET. AL.,
BLOCKCHAIN AND THE FIVE VECTORS OF PROGRESS 4, DELOITTE, (2018),
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/insights/us/articles/4600_Blockchain-fivevectors/DI_Blockchain-five-vectors.pdf.
130
See JAIKARAN, supra note 109, at 8.
131
See Aung & Chang, supra note 57, at 178.
132
John A. Painter et al., Attribution of Foodborne Illness, Hospitalizations, and
Deaths to Food Commodities by Using Outbreak Data, United States, 1998-2008,
19 EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES 407, 408–09 (2013) (describing these products
as “complex foods”).
133
See BLOCKCHAIN USE CASES FOR FOOD TRACEABILITY AND CONTROL 23, KAIROS
FUTURE (2017), https://www.sklkommentus.se/globalassets/kommentus/bilder/publ
ication-eng-blockchain-for-food-traceability-and-control-2017.pdf.
134
See IOANNIS LIANOS, BLOCKCHAIN COMPETITION: GAINING COMPETITIVE
ADVANTAGE IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 73 (2018), https://www.ucl.ac.uk/cles/sites/c
les/files/cles_8-2018.pdf.
135
See Laura Shin, Crypto Industry Frustrated by Haphazard Regulation, N.Y.
TIMES (June 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/27/business/dealbook/cr
ypto-industry-regulation.html.
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overly burdensome costs to industry, and restricting flexibility to
innovate with emerging blockchain systems. 136
Instead, handling the synthesis of WGS methods and
blockchain in the food supply chain may benefit from “softer”
regulatory approaches. As opposed to command and control
schemes, softer approaches offer a spectrum of regulatory
mechanisms lacking traditional legal enforceability. 137 So called
“soft law” enables more voluntary, innovative, and adaptable
regulatory possibilities by expanding definitions of oversight to
include regulation by private or public-private entities. 138 Limitations
of these softer approaches should guide their implementation and
combination, including the potential for reduced legitimacy,
inconsistent enforcement, and regulatory capture, as well as
coordination issues in public-private settings.139
Softer oversight should offer useful tools for advancing the
effective combination of blockchain and WGS technologies while
responding to governance challenges. Public-private or voluntary
oversight programs140 may ease tensions between government or
industry control over permissioned blockchains through leaving
control with industry while creating infrastructure for collaboration.
Such arrangements could promote the flow of blockchain and WGS
data across the public-private border during an outbreak while also
enabling government information gathering to measure the
effectiveness of blockchain implementation. 141 Federal regulators
already facilitate food industry action on traceability without
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wielding formal regulatory power. Following the November 2018
lettuce contamination, FDA coordinated stakeholders in forming a
task force to generate recommendations for improving traceability
with labeling. 142 These existing relationships could provide the
groundwork for close collaboration on governing blockchain and
WGS tools.
Technical standards, another soft regulatory tool, could
promote interoperability and facilitate common blockchain
architecture for WGS compatibility. 143 Third party standards can
provide technical guideposts to direct and stimulate innovation in
nascent technologies with various forms. 144 Civilian standard setting
bodies with high credibility including ISO and IEEE could build on
their existing projects on blockchain 145 to craft standards for
interoperability in food safety applications and WGS compatibility.
In the U.S., the National Institute of Standards and Technology could
provide a similar function as a public entity with expertise on
blockchain, 146 crafting voluntary standards with stakeholder input to
encourage data fluidity across blockchains and intersections with
public genomic databases.
V. Conclusion
Blockchain and WGS represent powerful emerging
technologies capable of bolstering regulatory and corporate response
to foodborne illnesses. The technologies carry complementary
strengths, combining increased traceability and accountability in the
food supply chain with enhanced identification of pathogens and
location of origin. With the clear potential to advance public health,
the convergence of blockchain and WGS appears inevitable.
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However, synthesis and implementation will require addressing
technical and governance challenges.
Government-based WGS operations must effectively
intersect with industry-driven blockchain developments to realize the
promise of both technologies. Questions arise over whether public or
private entities should retain control of permissioned platforms,
whether to use public or private blockchain architectures, and how to
address interoperability. Soft regulatory approaches offer a path to
balancing public and private interests in resolving these governance
challenges, though selecting exact oversight instruments should be
reevaluated as both technologies mature independently and together.
Successfully navigating governance and technical challenges to
bring blockchain and WGS together, though complex, should
promote public health and reduce foodborne illness burdens.

